Making sense of the NIE

With the news that the 16 US intelligence agencies have reached a consensus that Iran stopped developing a nuclear weapons program in 2003 due to international pressure, the urgency for quick action is dropping. But there are many reasons not to call it a day and move on:

• The assessment that Iran had not re-started its weapons program by mid-2007 was judged with only "moderate" confidence, because of intelligence gaps.
• The estimate was not able to conclude whether or not Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons.
• The report judged with "moderate-to-high confidence" that Iran is still "at a minimum" keeping the option open to develop nuclear weapons.
• The estimate highlighted that Iran would probably be using covert nuclear facilities rather than declared sites to convert and enrich uranium for a bomb.
• Finally, it "assess[es] with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so."
• Past NIE reports, namely the 2002 Iraq estimate -- and now perhaps a 2005 NIE on Iran -- were glaringly wrong in their intelligence assessments.
• Israeli intelligence and presumably that of some European capitals contradict the findings of this NIE.

It is fair to say that the mission has not been accomplished. It will undoubtedly be more difficult to persuade Russia and China in for another round of sanctions, but we still have to keep trying.

National Review offers a reasonably coherent defense of continued vigilance on Iran.